Another Strongman? Masculine Governmentality, Neoliberalism, and Authoritarian Traditionalism in Aliyev’s Azerbaijan

A decade ago, former Baku mayor Hajibala Abutalibov stated in an interview, "There is only one man in Azerbaijan, and he is our president," referring to Ilham Aliyev, then in his third term.1 Initially controversial on social media, this statement has since become emblematic of a broader acceptance of Aliyev's masculine dominance. Aliyev's authority, bolstered by his victory in Karabakh, reinforced Azerbaijani society as one of obedience and submission and secured Aliyev a fifth consecutive term in the 2024 snap elections. Though Aliyev has genuine supporters, these elections were, once again, undemocratic.

Aliyev's authoritarian strategies are a sour blend of anti-feminist and anti-democratic policies, aligning with the prevalent trend of right-wing authoritarianism embodied by the global emergence of "strongmen" like Putin, Erdoğan, Modi, and many others2.Reclaiming hegemonic masculinity – the dominant form of masculinity that legitimizes men's power over women, men and other gender identities3 – as a political force, Azerbaijan, like other patriarchal states, heavily relies on traditionalism. This traditionalism encompasses a set of values and norms that uphold the “natural difference” between men and women as a core feature of its ideological system. In that regard, some nation-states embrace traditionalism as a counterforce to modernity, while simultaneously reinforcing the ruling class's hegemonic masculinity, often embodied by “strongmen” leaders. While exercising top-down domination, anti-feminist and anti-LGBTQ policies, and selectively embracing modernity and neoliberal capitalism are vital aspects of these universal strongmen characteristics, there are also some particularities that underscore the authoritarian playbook at work in Azerbaijan, considering its distinctive historical, cultural, and societal background. Then, what role does masculine governmentality play in shaping the seemingly perpetual nature of authoritarian traditionalism of Aliyev’s regime?

Masculine Governmentality and Neoliberalism: Theory

Governmentality, a sociological concept introduced in the late 1970s by Michel Foucault, encompasses the diverse formal and everyday techniques and strategies employed by institutions and individuals to shape and oversee subjectivity.4 This process works by turning small, everyday actions (micro-practices) into a broader, organized (but often invisible) system for controlling society. It does this in two main ways: individualizing and totalizing.5 Individualizing influences how people see themselves and their identities. Eventually, focusing on personal subjectivity encourages individuals to act in certain ways, shaping them into obedient or compliant members of society. On the other hand, totalizing places individuals within larger systems of rules and norms, viewing them as collective entities, meaning that people are part of broader frameworks designed to regulate behavior and ensure conformity on a societal scale6.

Thus, from a governmentality perspective, masculinity (or masculinities) is not only an individual trait but also a set of norms and behaviors that are strategically promoted and regulated by various societal agents. These agents include the family, army, educational systems, media, and religious institutions, all of which contribute to forming gendered subjects. 

Governmentality also challenges the predominant understanding of the borderline between autocracies and democracies. The deconstructive premise of the governmentality critique of the liberal-democratic-illiberal-autocratic axis claims that liberalism has misunderstood itself – that, despite its claims of wanting to emancipate individuals from the relations of domination associated with an all-powerful sovereign, liberalism has sought to forge more subtle, nuanced and insidious forms of governmentality, in which the individual self is rendered more compliant and manageable7. Then, while in illiberal regimes, masculine hegemony might seem visible and crude, in liberal regimes, it is more implicit or invisible.

This underlying masculinist framework becomes even more pronounced when linked to neoliberal economic policies. As seen in many post-socialist contexts, the rise of neoliberalism universalized these gendered power relations, entrenching patriarchal norms within both economic and political systems. Typical of neoliberal emergence, in most post-socialist countries, the structural changes in the economy brought about by the “transition to a market economy" were seen as “empowering women through microcredits” rather than creating new forms of dependencies8. However, the transition to a market economy tends to reproduce and reinforce the patriarchal nature of existing structures. This shift deepens women's subordination by undervaluing public childcare and social services while also transferring the responsibility for these services entirely onto women. 

Then, in such contexts, the blend becomes unique because it upholds every possible ambiguity; from autocratic governance with masculine traits to the neoliberal emphasis on individual autonomy, creating a new form of governmentality. By intertwining traditional masculine ideals with governance structures, this framework reveals how neoliberalism and other forms of governance perpetuate gendered power relations. These dynamics, whether through overt or subtle forms of control, maintain and reproduce a system that not only reinforces male dominance but also shapes individual subjectivity to conform to broader societal expectations. As a result, both liberal and illiberal regimes contribute to the creation of gendered subjects who navigate and uphold these power structures, ultimately ensuring the persistence of masculinist ideologies within contemporary governance. 

Like Father, Like Son

The father-son dynamic between Ilham Aliyev and Heydar Aliyev, who had been ruling Azerbaijan and Soviet Azerbaijan since 1969, reveals ideas about the generational transfer of power and the evolution of masculine governmentality. In 2003, Ilham Aliyev inherited the presidency from his father, Heydar Aliyev, who ruled Azerbaijan with increasing authoritarianism, nepotism, and strategic use of oil revenues. A former KGB general and Soviet Politburo member, Heydar's leadership style combined patriarchal authoritarianism with a paternalistic model, positioning him not just as the father of Ilham, but the whole Azerbaijani nation9.

Moreover, Heydar Aliyev's KGB background and subsequent leadership in Azerbaijan shaped Ilham Aliyev's early years, setting the stage for his transition from Soviet-era governance to a more personalized and neoliberal form of governance, expanding "family companies" that later completely monopolized the market. Thus, during Heydar Aliyev's post-Soviet rule, people who still expected the state to provide for their social welfare, just like in Soviet Union, were unaware that they would not receive any social security from the state or "corporations" under Ilham Aliyev. 

This transition required not only material, but also symbolic changes. In 2003, when Ilham first took the power from his father, many indicated that his rise represented the emergence of a Western-oriented "liberal with a global outlook" – a direct quote from Ali Hasanov, the president's then chief aide10. Eventually, Aliyev’s reformist image backfired for the Soviet “apparatchiks”11. The subsequent purge of Ali Hasanov and other Soviet-era bureaucrats, and promotion of Western-educated loyalists provided the façade of a shift toward a more neoliberal and Western-friendly governance structure.

After effectively consolidating various forms of authoritarian neoliberalism, Ilham Aliyev strategically embraced traditionalism – a political approach that emphasizes the preservation of longstanding cultural, social, and institutional norms – to further solidify his governance.12 Within the interplay of modernity and traditionalism, he endorsed “national modernity” that promotes traditionalism to the population and modernity for the function of the market economy.

Ilham Aliyev’s administration developed a strong personality cult of Heydar Aliyev after his death in 2003: from schools to offices and barber shops, from road posters to street names, from regional centres that have grown like mushrooms with their unknown functions to museums that symbolize and memorize Heydar Aliyev13.

Ilham Aliyev's strong emphasis on the cult of Heydarism paves the way for the development of his own cult, aiming to portray eternal leadership as a legacy passed down through the family bond. Aliyev's greatest achievement, the return of the city of Shusha (Shushi for Armenians) to Azerbaijani control during the 2020 Karabakh war, marks a high point in this transition. He proudly declared: "I am happy to have fulfilled my father's will"14. Although it ensured the transition from his father’s cult to his own, Aliyev's enduring popularity and perceived indispensability have been bolstered not merely through this victory, but also through years of strategic propaganda orchestrated by the regime and its purported "grassroots" allies, notably the various pro-Aliyev youth factions affiliated with the ruling YAP party (New Azerbaijan Party) founded by his father. Groups, such as İlhamçılar (Supporters of İlham) and İrəliçilər (Supporters of Forward movement), emerged soon after Aliyev assumed power in 2003 and have played a pivotal role in shaping the narrative of widespread support for him15. Under the rallying cry of "İlhamla irəli" (Forward with Ilham), they emphasize his attributes of strength, patriotism, and safeguarding of Azerbaijan's national interests16. Thus, despite the symbolic change of governance from Heydar to his son Ilham, the underlining ideology of masculine governmentality remains. 

Symbolic Femininity as a Facade

The connection between hegemonic masculinity and governmentality is evident in how power structures include women to perpetuate male dominance. In Azerbaijan, political, economic, and social institutions are male dominated, but including women in these hierarchies has become a neoliberal strategy that co-opts women's agencies and needs. Indeed, this tendency sheds light on the core principles of neoliberal governance, supporting the assertions of numerous feminist scholars who argue that neoliberal governance inherently perpetuates and reinforces gendered divisions17. This gendered division is not only symbolic, but also material as both power and labour are allocated based on the gendered difference. On the one hand, women in power are nothing more than reproducers of male dominance, usually compromising to be on a secondary level in the hierarchies. On the other hand, women’s position in society is still valued through their familial and feminized labour. In essence, the masculine governmentality that Aliyev’s regime embraces is not inherently contradictory to the neoliberal modes of governmentality. For instance, in Azerbaijan, the representation of Ilham Aliyev's wife, Mehriban Aliyeva, as that of someone on a secondary level of power, makes this relevant. 

Before the 2018 presidential elections, Aliyev's appointment of Mehriban as vice president began to show how power is distributed within the family18. Despite Aliyeva belonging to the influential Pashayev family and owning most of the resources in the country, she hasn’t become president as was once expected by many Azerbaijani observers. In fact, since then, it has become clear how Aliyev preserves patriarchal values by emphasizing the traditional view and placing Mehriban as a "symbol of peace, harmony and love within the family"19 rather than a political force. Being a symbol of femininity, lavish life and philanthropy, like the wives of other authoritarian leaders, the image of Mehriban effectively created a public assumption about the genuine benevolence of Aliyev’s family and made Ilham appear more approachable and relatable. Mehriban asserts a national identity or a national joy that represents classed, gendered and sexualized bodies20. She has not only met the national expectations but has also established the ideal feminine image that shapes these expectations. Thus, the representation of Aliyev’s family not only encompasses the ideal Azerbaijani family, but also contributes to the formation of public desires and norms, especially among the younger generation.

From War to Hegemony

Understanding the transformation of the gender regime in Azerbaijan requires recognizing its ties to national myths that emerged after the First Karabakh war and the Soviet Union's collapse. The post-war period and the shift to a market economy in the 1990s reshaped masculinities, disrupting class hierarchies and material disparities, and redefining masculinity within an emerging neoliberal framework.21

The re-traditionalization evolved both on the societal and political levels, through a deep militarizing and nationalizing of every state institution, including schools and media. Schools are probably the most fertile ground for expanding militarization ideology. Most schools are named after war heroes or martyrs and usually have sites commemorating them. For high school students in 10th and 11th grades, there are compulsory classes called “pre-service training of young people” aiming to prepare youths: boys for military service and girls for first aid services.22

However, Aliyev and his inner circle exhibit a paradox: despite their lack of personal military achievements, they adeptly orchestrate militarized policies while avoiding direct military service. This dissonance is exacerbated by the public's awareness that the elite rarely send their sons to serve. To mitigate this, in 2018 Aliyev sent his son, Heydar Aliyev, to serve in the military, a gesture aimed at addressing public concerns but not changing power dynamics.23 To exaggerate the significance of Heydar Aliyev's military service, most government officials emphasized the necessity of military services for all, regardless of one’s privilege. Addressing this, one of the MPs representing the ruling party commented: "Mr. President's son Heydar Aliyev taking on military service is an exemplary step for everyone, including all the children of officials. If the President's son fulfils military service, why shouldn't others serve?"24. 

“Yalnız kasıbın balaları ölür” (Only poor people’s children are dying) has always been the key to public discourse around war and martyrdom. Thus, heroes, in the eyes of the public, have mostly been young people coming from poor families and the ruling class could not reach that status until 2020. The perception, particularly towards Aliyev, changed after the 2020 war when he was bestowed with the title "Qalib Sərkərdə" (Victorious Commander), and the victory in Karabakh made him, in the eyes of most Azerbaijanis, a strong warrior who was not required to fight. He later strategically exhibited this self-proclaimed heroism by visiting Suqovushan, a territory in Karabakh that was returned to Azerbaijani control during the 2020 war and addressed a message to the former president of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan, by saying: “Serjik, if you are a real man, come here”25. 

Although Aliyev gained strong popularity after the war, he still requires everyday autocratic techniques to maintain power. Political opposition and civil society are going through waves of crackdowns26 and the general population seems to observe this with apathy. On one hand, people clutch onto the belief that Aliyev is, in fact, the mythical saviour they have been waiting for, someone who solved the “Karabakh problem” and alleviated their collective suffering. On the other hand, people tend to ignore problems that do not relate to Karabakh and continue living in conformity.

Conclusion

This paper critically examines the intricate dynamics of masculine governmentality under Ilham Aliyev’s regime, revealing how a blend of traditionalism, neoliberalism, and autocracy has perpetuated a deeply gendered and authoritarian form of governance in Azerbaijan. The exploration of Aliyev’s rise to power, the inheritance of patriarchal structures from his father, and the strategic deployment of gendered policies illustrate how masculinity is not merely a personal trait, but a political tool wielded to sustain authoritarian control. By intertwining neoliberal modernity with traditionalism, Aliyev has successfully maintained a façade of progressiveness while reinforcing patriarchal and autocratic values.

While contextualizing Aliyev's regime within the broader trend of global "strongmen" leaders, it becomes evident how masculinist governance transcends cultural and political boundaries. Thus, the concept of masculine governmentality unearths the ways in which state mechanisms, social institutions, and public narratives reinforce male dominance under the guise of neoliberal reforms. The paradoxical nature of regimes like the one in Azerbaijan, where superficial gestures towards gender equality and modern governance coexist with deeply entrenched gendered hierarchies and the symbolic use of femininity to uphold male dominance, is directly linked with these neoliberal tendencies. 

Yet Aliyev’s consolidation of power — exemplified by the symbolic transition from his father’s legacy to his own — not only co-opts neoliberal values, but also exploits national myths, militarization, and strategic traditionalism to entrench patriarchal control. The exploration of how Heydar Aliyev's legacy is instrumentalized — through both his cult and the militarized symbolism surrounding the Karabakh victory — sheds light on the regime's ability to harness nationalistic fervor while stifling dissent. The merger of militarized masculinity with neoliberalism reveals a regime that is not only authoritarian but also highly adaptable, blending modernity and traditionalism to sustain its dominance.

In conclusion, Aliyev’s authoritarian traditionalism is neither purely anachronistic nor merely a localized phenomenon but rather a sophisticated interplay of gender, governance, and neoliberalism. This synthesis not only reinforces Aliyev’s regime but also speaks to broader global trends where masculine governmentality continues to thrive. Understanding this is crucial for grasping the resilience of autocratic regimes and the subtle ways they perpetuate patriarchal control while responding to the demands of global capitalism, their own financial interests, and nationalistic sentiments.

The content of the article is the sole responsibility of the author and can in no way be taken ro reflect the views of the Heinrich Boell Foundation Tbiilsi Office - South Caucasus Region.